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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 55 DECEMBER 1956 
COMPELLING THE TESTIMONY OF 
POLITICAL DEVIANTS* 
0.] ohn Roggef 
No. 2 
AT the last term ·the United States Supreme Court in Ullmann 
rl.. v. United States1 upheld the constitutionality of paragraph 
(c) of a federal act of August 1954 which seeks to compel the testi-
mony of communists and other political deviants.2 Paragraph (c) 
relates to witnesses before federal courts and grand juries. The 
Court specifically left open the question of the validity of para-
graphs (a) and (b) relating to congressional witnesses. Justice 
Frankfurter delivered the Court's opinion. Justice Douglas, with 
the concurrence of Justice Black, wrote a dissent. 
It is our purpose to consider the background, history and terms 
of this compulsory testimony act, the validity of the Court's de-
•This article is being published in two instalments.-Ed. 
tMember, New York Bar; A.B. 1922, University of Illinois, LL.B. 1925, S.J.D. 1931, 
Harvard Law School; formerly (1939-40) United States Assistant Attorney General in 
charge of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice; author, Our Vanishing 
Civil Liberties (1949).-Ed. 
1350 U.S. 422 (1956), affirming (2d Cir. 1955) 221 F. (2d) 760, affirming (S.D.N.Y. 
1955) 128 F. Supp. 617 (Ullmann spelled with one "n" by the district court). The court 
of appe~s affirmed reluctantly and with regret on the basis of the district court's opinion. 
2 The act as originally proposed applied to all types of crime, but it was narrowed 
before passage. Representative Kenneth B. Keating of New York, who sponsored in the 
House the bill (S.16, 83d Cong.) which became law, in explaining the final form of this 
bill stated: "Mr. Speaker, this bill is a very important piece of legislation to further the 
struggle against the Communist conspiracy on all fronts, in the activities of investigating 
committees representing the legislative arm of Government and in the prosecutive func-
tions carried on through the executive branch. . . • This bill as now worded and now 
before us exclusively applies only to investigations dealing with or prosecutions for the 
crimes of treason, sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy, and violations of 
certain specific statutes, all of which deal with the Communist conspiracy." 100 CoNG. REC. 
13323-13324 (1954). 
Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., shortly after the passage of the act, in an 
address at Plymouth, Massachusetts to the twentieth general congress of the General 
Society of Mayflower Descendants, commented: "Another new law is the so-called Im-
munity Law. This was requested by the Administration in order to prevent persons 
from making a sham of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination. Those 
persons-subversives, their sympathizers or misguided persons-have been using the Fifth 
Amendment in order to shield persons they knew to be part and parcel of the communist 
conspiracy." Sept. 13, 1954, p. 5. 
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cision, and the history, constitutionality and utility of such acts 
generally. We shall be particularly concerned with the testimony 
of political deviants. 
Background and History of the New Federal Act 
The new federal act was a part of our effort against the threat 
involved in the aggressive and proselytizing course of international 
communism, a movement which began to make its impact on us 
from the time when the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in 1917. 
Indeed, some of the Russian Bolshevik leaders were in New York 
City in the early part of that year, among them both Leon Trotsky 
and Nikolai I. Bukharin. Trotsky was here for two· months be-
ginning the middle of January. Bukharin was here even longer. 
He arrived in November 1916 and left after Trotsky did. Two 
years later Socialist Party members held a Left vVing conference 
in New York City, June 21-24, 1919, which adopted a resolution 
urging all revolutionary socialists to send delegates to a forthcom-
ing Socialist Party convention at Chicago. These delegates were 
to be prepared to form a new party if the Socialist Party refused. to 
reinstate all suspended and expelled members. The · conference 
also instructed its executive committee to draft and publish the 
"Left Wing Manifesto" and adopted Revolutionary Age as the 
Left Wing's official newspaper. The Manifesto appeare_d in_ the 
July 5, 1919 Revolutionary Age and furnished the basis for "the 
co!!-viction of its business manager, Benjamin Gitlow, of criminal 
anarchy in New York.3 
The United States Senate began to -investigate :communist 
propaganda in this country as early as 1919.4 So too did the state 
of New York. Its legislature created the Joint Committee Investi-
gating Seditious Activities, often called the Lusk Committee, after 
Senator Clayton R. Lusk, who headed it.5 Since then tjier~ have 
been many investigations by many committees; state as well as 
, federal, of individuals regarded as communists or communist 
sympathizers and groups and organizations thought to be com-
munist or communist dominated. 
In 1938 came the House of Representative's Special Commit-
tee on Un-American Activities,6 which was continued from time 
8 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
4 S. Doc. 62, 66th Cong., 1st sess., v.l, p. xxix, v.3. 
5 DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC REcoRD OF COMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES 680-681 (Fund 
for the Republic, 1955). 
6 H.R. Res. 282, 83 CONG. R.Ec. 7586 (1938) 
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to time until 1945, when it became the Committee on Un-Ameri-
can Activities, and a standing committee.7 Thereafter it was some-
times known by the name of one of its subsequent chairmen, John 
S. Wood of Georgia, J. Parnell Thomas of New Jersey, Harold 
H. Velde of Illinois or Francis E. Walter of Pennsylvania. 
The peak in congressional investigations of communists and 
communist sympathizers or those thought to be such occurred in 
the years 1953 and 1954. During this period Congress had not 
one but a number of bodies engaged in such investigations. The 
three most active ones were: Permanent Subcommittee on In-
vestigations of the Committee on Government Operations, chaired 
by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin; Subcommittee on 
Internal Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, headed by 
Senator William E. Jenner of Indiana; and the House Commit-
tee on Un-American Activities, headed by Representative Velde. 
These three committees were often known from their respective 
chairmen as the McCarthy, Jenner, and Velde Committees. The 
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in turn created a task force 
under the chairmanship of Senator John M. Butler of Maryland 
to investigate communist infiltration into labor unions. The 
House also had a Special Committee to Investigate Foundations, 
chaired by B. Carroll Reece of Tennessee.8 
The longest-lived of these committees, and consequently the 
one that had the most to do with alleged subversives, was the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities. At first those who 
refused to testify or produce requested documents before this body 
raised the objection that the resolution authorizing the commit-
tee's investigations was unconstitutional on the ground, among 
others, that it trespassed on First Amendment freedoms. How-
ever the lower federal courts sustained the validity of the resolu-
tion, and the Supreme Court denied review.9 
7 DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC REcoRD OF COMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES 589, 606-607 
(Fund for the Republic, 1955). 
8 See id. at 523-543, 643-650, and S. Doc. 40, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 297-299, 319-326 
(1955), for a summary of the work of these groups. 
9 Lawson v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 49, cert. den. 839 U.S. 934 
(1950); Barsky v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241, cert. den. 334 U.S. 843 
(1948), petition for rehearing den. 339 U.S. 971 (1950); United States v. Josephson, (2d 
Cir. 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. 333 U.S. 838 (1948), rehearing den. 333 U.S. 858 (1948). 
In two of a later series of cases the Supreme Court did grant certiorari and reversed the 
court below, but did so on Fifth rather than First Amendment grounds. Emspak v. 
United States, 849 U.S. 190 (1955), reversing (D.C. Cir. 1952) 203 F. (2d) 54; Quinn v. 
United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955), reversing (D.C. Cir. 1952) 203 F. (2d) 20. In these two 
cases the defendants relied primarily on the First Amendment, but also tacked on the 
Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Emspak case in 1953 
(346 U.S. 809) and in the Quinn case in June 1954 (347 U.S. 1008). 
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Meanwhile the Department of Justice began presenting evi-
dence to a grand jury in the Southern District of New York, and 
in July 1948 obtained an indictment against William Z. Foster, 
national chairman, Eugene Dennis, general secretary, and ten other 
top leaders of the American Communist Party, charging them 
with a conspiracy to organize the Communist Party of the United 
States as a group to teach and advocate the overthrow of our gov-
ernment by force and violence in violation of the Smith Act, passed 
in 1940. This case went to trial in 1949 as to all but Foster, who 
was severed from it because of ill health, and after nine months 
resulted in a verdict of guilty as to all remaining eleven defendants. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a judgment 
of conviction in July 1950.10 
With these events witnesses before grand juries and congres-
sional committees began to claim their Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. One such witness was Patricia Blau, 
before a federal grand jury in Denver. The Supreme Court sus-
tained her claim in December 1950.11 That this claim was also 
available to a witness before a congressional committee was gener-
ally recognized, and later cases repeatedly so held.12 Then the fol-
lowing June the Supreme Court affirmed the Dennis 13 case. 
The stage was now set for numerous claims of privilege, and 
they were forthcoming. With them came a mounting demand that 
witnesses talk, and for an immunity act, which would confront 
them with the alternative either of doing so or going to jail for 
10 United States v. Dennis, (2d Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 201. 
11 Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950). 
12 Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 
155 (1955); United States v. Costello, (2d Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 200, cert. den. 344 U.S. 
874 (1952); Starkovich v. United States, (9th Cir. 1956) 231 F. (2d) 411; Jackins v. United 
States, (9th Cir. 1956) 231 F. (2d) 405; United States v. Doto Goe Adonis), (2d Cir. 1953) 
205 F. (2d) 416; Aiuppa v. United States, {6th Cir. 1952) 201 F. (2d) 287; Accardo v. United 
States, (5th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 1021; Marcello v. United States, (5th Cir. 1952) 196 
F. (2d) 437; Poretto v. United States, {5th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 392; United States v. 
Fischetti, (D.C.D.C. 1952) 103 F. Supp. 796; United States v. Pechart, (N.D.Cal. 1952) 
103 F. Supp. 417; United States v. Nelson, (D.C.D.C. 1952) 103 F. Supp. 215; United States 
v. Licavoli, (N.D. Ohio 1952) 102 F. Supp. 607; United States v. DiCarlo, (N.D. Ohio 1952) 
102 F. Supp. 597; United States v. Cohen, (N.D. Cal. 1952) 101 F. Supp. 906; United 
States v. Jaffe, (D.C.D.C. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 191; United States v. Raley, (D.C.D.C. 1951) 
96 F. Supp. 495; United States v. Fitzpatrick, (D.C.D.C. 1951) 96 F. Supp. 491; United 
States v. Yukio Abe, (D.C. Hawaii, Jan. 16, 1951) 19 U.S. Law Week 2321; numerous 
unreported decisions. See Carlson v. United States, (1st Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 209 at 212; 
Cohen v. United States, (9th Cir. 1953) 201 F. (2d) 386 at 390, cert. den. 345 U.S. 951 
(1953); United States v. Yukio Abe, (D.C. Hawaii 1950) 95 F. Supp. 991 at 992. Cf. 
Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172, 9 A. 22 (1871); Matter of Doyle, 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489 
(1931); Ex parte Johnson, 187 S.C. 1, 196 S.E. 164 (1938). See State v. James, 36 Wash. 
(2d) 882 at 897, 221 P. (2d) 482 (1950). See note, 49 CoL. L. REv. 87 (1949). 
1s Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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contempt. Benjamin F. Wright, the president of Smith College, 
wrote: "The central issue may be divided into two parts: Should 
one who is called before such a committee testify about his pres-
ent and past memberships and activities in the Communist Party? 
Should a witness give the names of persons whom he knew to be 
engaged in such activity? In my opinion the answer to both of 
these questions is 'yes' .... "14 A former magistrate in New York, 
Morris Ploscowe, in discussing the Fifth Amendment's privilege 
against self-incrimination, stated: "In the course of this article, 
I am going to tell you how, by using a very simple, ingenious legal 
device, we can effectively deal with the gangsters and Communists 
who are trying to destroy our society while hiding behind this 
shield which has been furnished them by the Constitution it-
self. "111 His remedy was of course an immunity statute. In October 
1953, Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., in an address be-
fore the National Press Club, Washington, D. C., declared, "Sub-
versives and criminals have not been slow to rely upon this pro-
vision which was written into our Constitution to protect law-
abiding citizens against tyranny and despotism"; and followed by 
asking, "Can we afford to permit these wrongdoers to destroy the 
institutions of freedom by hiding behind the shield of this consti-
tutional privilege?"16 He concluded his address with the announce-
ment that the Department of Justice would seek an immunity 
statute at the forthcoming session of Congress. President Eisen-
hower in his State-of-the-Union message in January 1954 referred 
to the Attorney General's proposed immunity bill.17 
After the Supreme Court's decision in the Blau case various 
immunity bills were introduced in Congress. The first one was 
by Senator Pat McCarren of Nevada, in May 1951, S. 1570, 82d 
Congress.18 It authorized a congressional committee by a two-
thir.ds vote, including at least one member of the minority party, 
14 "Should Teachers Testify," SAT. REv., Sept. 26, 1953, pp. 22, 23. 
lli "How to Make Gangsters Talk," THIS WEEK MAGAZINE, Feb. 1, 1953, pp. 7, 34-35. 
See Dowling, "I Stand on the Fifth Amendment," N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 1953, §6, p. IO. 
16 "Remedy for Abuse of Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," Oct. 
14, J.953, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1953, p. 1:5. He repeated the substance of this speech in 
an address before the Law Club of Chicago, Nov. 6, 1953. "Immunity from Prosecution 
Versus Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," reprinted in full in U.S. NEWS &: WoRLD 
REPORT, Dec. 25, 1953, pp. 90-95, and in 28 TULANE L. REv. I (1953); 14 FED. B.J. 91 (1954). 
REPORT, Dec. 25, 1953, pp. 90-95. In the latter speech he stated that "subversives and 
In the latter speech he stated that "subversives and criminals have been quick to rely" 
upon their privilege. 
17 N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1954, p. 10:3. 
18 97 CoNc. REc. 5972. It was reported favorably by the Committee on the Judiciary. 
S. Rep. 717, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951). 
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to grant immunity to a witness. In the same session the Special 
Committee . to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Com-
merce, frequently known as the Kefauver Committee, after its 
chairman, Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, proposed a bill, 
S. 1747, to vest immunity powers in the attorney general in any 
proceeding before a federal court or grand jury,19 and endorsed 
not only its own bill but also that of Senator McCarran.20 So too 
did the American Bar Association Commission on Organized 
Crime.21 Neither bill passed, but new bills were introduced in 
1953. Senator McCarran's bill was S. 16, 83d Congress, and the 
Kefauver Committee's bill was S. 565. The Department of Justice, 
because it was charged with the prosecution of offenses, and aware 
of the fact that under the law as it then stood all grants of im-
munity from prosecution rested solely with agents of the execu-
tive branch of government, objected to S. 16 on the ground that 
it gave no participation to the attorney general. Deputy Attor-
ney General William P. Rogers wrote to Senator William Langer, 
then Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: "This 
Department is disturbed, however, by the failure of the bill to 
provide that the Attorney General shall participate in the granting 
of any immunity to a witness before a congressional committee 
or before either House of Congress. The Attorney General is the 
chief legal officer of the Government of the United States. . . .Not 
only must this responsibility be coupled with an authority ade-
quate to permit its discharge, but in addition it would seem in-
advisable for others to be cloaked with an authority capable of pre-
venting the Attorney General from fully performing his duty."22 
Nevertheless S. 16 passed the Senate in 1953,23 but not the House. 
In January 1954. Representative Kenneth B. Keating of New 
York introduced an immunity bill, H.R. 6899, which had the en-
dorsement of the attorney general.24 This bill applied not only 
to witnesses before congressional committees or before either 
House, but also before federal courts or grand juries. The ultimate 
decision to grant immunity rested in all instances with'the attorne,y 
general. Yet other immunity bills were introduced in the House, 
both in 1953 and 1954.215 Senator McCarran objecte~ to H.R. 6899 
· 10 97 CoNG. REc. 7015 (1951). 
20 S. Rep. 725, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 94-95 (1951). 
•21REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, vol. 1, pp. 59-60 (1952). 
22 S. Rep. 153, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 15 (1953). · 
2s 99 CONG. REc. 8357 (1953). 
24 100 CONG. REc. 13323 (1954). 
26 H.R. 2737, H.R. 4489, H.R. 6948. 
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on the ground that "any such grant of a veto power to the Attorney 
General ... would be a violation of the separation of powers."26 
Both of Senator McCarran's bills, S. 1570, 82d Congress and S. 16, 
83d Congress, which related only to witnesses before congressional 
committees, provided for a grant of immunity without the ap-
proval of any outside agency. After a long tug of war between 
Senator McCarran and Attorney General Brownell_ a compromise 
was finally arrived at pursuant to which S. 16 was revised to pro-
vide for three participants in grants of immunity. Two of the 
participants were to be the attorney general and a federal district 
court. In the case of congressional witnesses the third hand was to 
be Congress or one of its committees; and in the case of other 
witnesses, a federal district attorney. The court was to be the final 
arbiter in all instances. This revision occurred in the House. The 
House Report on S. 16 in its revised form stated: "In all cases 
where the bill authorizes a grant of immunity there are at least 
two other independent but interested parties who must concur 
in the grant of immunity in order to meet the requirements of the 
bill."27 This statement is not quite accurate, for in the case of 
congressional witnesses, if the attorney general does not concur, 
the Congress or one of its committees may nevertheless proceed 
to grant immunity with the approval of the appropriate federal 
district court. 
On August 4, 1954 the House passed this revision of S. 16 by a 
vote of 294 to 55.28 A week later the Senate concurred in the House 
amendments with but a single dissenting voice, that of Senator 
Herbert H. Lehman of New York, and even his opposition to the 
passage of the measure was limited "to the manner in which it 
has been brought up."29 On August 20, 1954 the president ap-
proved it. so 
The same day Congressman Keating declared: "This is the 
most important and effective piece of legislation dealing with the 
Communist conspiracy that has been enacted at this session. It 
will loosen the tongues of some reluctant witnesses and prevent 
higher-ups from escaping punishment for lack of evidence. Armed 
with this ·weapon, our law enforcement officials should be greatly 
fortified in their continuing war against our internal enemies."81 
26 100 CoNc. R.Ec. 13997 (1954). 
27 H.R. Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 8 (1954). 
28 100 CONG. R.Ec. 13333 (1954). 
29 Id. at 13998. 
• so 18 u.s.c. (Supp. m, 1956) §3486. 
Sl N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1954, p. 6:1. 
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A few days later President Eisenhower explained: "Last week I 
signed a bill granting immunity from prosecution to certain sus-
pected persons in order to aid in obtaining the conviction of sub-
versives. Investigation and prosecution of crimes involving na-
tional security have been seriously hampered by witnesses who 
have invoked the constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion embodied in the Fifth Amendment. This act provides a new 
means of breaking through the secrecy which is characteristic of 
traitors, spies and saboteurs. "32 
As finally passed the new federal immunity act applies to wit-
nesses before either House of Congress, congressional committees, 
and federal courts and grand juries, and to investigations into trea-
son, sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy and the 
overthrow of the government by force or violence. Court approval 
must be secured in every instance. For an offer of immunity to a 
congressional witness there must be an affirmative vote of a majori-
ty of the members present if the witness is before either House, 
and of two-thirds of the members of the full committee if he is 
before a committee. The attorney general must be notified when 
either House or any congressional committee proposes to grant 
immunity, and also of any application for court approval of the 
proposed grant. The immunity granted is freedom from prosecu-
tion for or subjection to "any penalty or forfeiture for or on ac-
count of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is 
so compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-in-
crimination, to testify or produce evidence," except prosecution 
for "perjury or contempt while giving testimony or producing evi-
dence." 
In form, the new immunity act is an amendment of the first 
federal immunity statute, passed in 1857,33 and amended m 
1862.34 In fact it w-as almost a complete substitution. 
Approval of Proposed Immunity Grants 
A Nonjudicial Function 
The most serious legal question which the federal act raises is 
this: does it seek to confer on federal courts a nonjudicial function 
in violation of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution? Immunity 
acts involve the determination of a policy question: is it desirable 
32 N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1954, p. 16:3. 
33 11 Stat. 155, 156, §2 (1857). 
M 12 Stat. 333 (1862). It became successively Rev. Stat. §859 (1875), 28 U.S.C. (1940) 
§634, and 18 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1956) §3486. 
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in a particular instance to grant an offender freedom from prosecu-
tion in order to confront him with the choice either of telling what 
he knows or going to jail? In the past such determinations have 
been made almost exclusively by agents of the executive branch of 
government in connection with the investigation and prosecution 
of offenses. Until the act of August 1954 the only federal exception 
was the act of 1857 in its broad form, an exception which lasted 
but five years. 
Does the act of August 1954 require federal courts to participate 
in the determination of the advisability of proposed grants of im-
munity? It would seem so. Clearly this is the case in the instance 
of such a proposed grant to a witness before one of the Houses of 
Congress or a congressional committee, for here paragraph (b) 
of the act speci~cally calls for the "approval" of a federal district 
court. Congress intended no difference in result between this 
paragraph and the following paragraph (c), relating to a witness 
before a federal court or grand jury, despite the fact that the latter 
paragraph refers only to an "order" of a federal district court. 
Originally neither Congressman Keating's bill, H.R. 6899, nor 
Senator McCarran's bill, S. 16, contained any provision for court 
approval. Then S. 16 was revised in the House to provide for 
court approval in all instances, or at least so Congress thought. 
The House Report on S. 16 in its revised form, after summarizing 
paragraphs (a)- (c), specifically states: "In all cases where the bill 
authorizes a grant of immunity after privilege has been claimed, 
there are at least two other independent but interested parties 
who must concur in the grant of immunity in order to meet the 
requirements of the bill."35 District Judge Weinfeld, before 
whom the Ullmann case arose, tried to escape from the effect of 
this language by suggesting that the phrase "independent but in-
terested parties" referred, in the case of paragraph (c), to a dis-
trict attorney and the attorney general.36 But the language is not 
"two independent but interested parties"; it is "two other in-
dependent but interested parties." The words "two other" can 
refer only, in the case of paragraph (c), to a district judge as well 
as the attorney general. 
Moreover, Congressman Keating, a member of the Judiciary 
Committee of the House, and the measure's leading sponsor in 
that body, specifically took the position that so far as court approval 
a5 H. R. Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 8 (1954). 
36 128 F. Supp. 617 at 626 (1955). 
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was concerned there was no difference between paragraphs (b) 
and (c). In debate on the measure he stated: 
". . . it does not leave the final determination as to the 
granting of immunity in either the hands of the investigating 
-committee or the Attorney General, but rather the court ... _. 
"As to (a), proceedings before a congressional committee, 
it provides that if a congressional committee or either House 
of Congress itself concludes that it is desirable to grant im-
munity to some witness in order to obtain evidence regarding 
some higher up or someone else, then the congressional com-
mittee shall give notice to the Attorney General of an applica-
tion to a court and the court shall be the final arbiter as to 
whether or not immunity should be granted. The Attorney 
General can appear in court and say: 'I agree with the com-
mittee,' or he can appear there and say, 'I disagree with the 
committee. This is a case where immunity should not be 
- granted,' and the court will have the final word in the matter. 
"Section (c) deals with proceedings ·before a court or 
grand jury. In that case it says that if the United States 
attorney in a particular area has a prosecution before him and 
feels that immunity should be granted to some prospective 
witness, he shall first get the approval of the Attorney General 
to the granting of that immunity and then shall appeal to the 
court and the court will pass on the question, and if con-
vinced of the propriety, issue the order for immunity."37 
After explaining that a grant of immunity was "really a sort of 
bargaining process," and pointing out that a prosecutor or a con-
gressional committee might sometimes get out-traded, -Congress-
man Keating went on to maize plain that courts were to be a part 
of this process in every instance of a proposed grant of immunity 
under the new act: 
"The _feature of the bill before us which I especially com-
mend to your favorable attention-is intended to talze care 
9f thi~ problem of blind bargaining. It requires, in the case 
of congressional investigations, virtual agreement between all 
three branches of the Government-legislative, executive, and 
judicial-before an effective grant of immunity is conferred. 
In court proceedings it requires approval of both the prose-
cutor and the court."38 
37 100 CONG. REc. 13323 (1954). 
38 Id. at 13324. 
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Senator McCarran, who introduced S. 16, and was the bill's 
leading sponsor in the Senate, took the same position in debate 
there that Congressman Keating had taken in the House.39 
Before the Ullmann case arose, the Attorney General, too, took 
the same position as Congressman Keating. In a speech at 
Plymouth, Massachusetts to the twentieth general congress of the 
General Society of Mayflower Descendants he said that immunity 
"will be granted by a Federal District Judge, after advice from 
the Attorney General, upon petition of a United States Attorney 
or a representative of Congress."40 
Judge Weinfeld, after questioning the weight to be given to 
remarks made in general debate by individual members of a re-
porting committee in determining congressional intent,41 referred 
to a statement by Congressman Francis E. Walter of Pennsylvania, 
who was also a member of the House Judiciary Committee, and 
commented that he "took a quite different view" from Congress-
man Keating. Congressman Walter did say at one point that 
"before a person can be granted immunity the court is called upon 
to act on the question of the materiality and the germaneness of 
the matter under inquiry";42 but a few moments later, in response 
to Representative Jacob K. Javits of New York, who remarked, 
" ... The court would not I believe inquire into the advisability 
or lack of it in giving an immunity bath," stated: "After all, when 
it comes to the question of the wisdom, I just think that is a ques-
tion of materiality."43 Either he did not distinguish between the 
question of the wisdom of a proposed grant of immunity and 
questions of materiality and pertinency, or he equated all of them. 
Then this interchange took place: 
"MR. J A VITS. The Congress will have decided that [ ma-
teriality] and the court will just rely upon the decision made 
by the committee or the House? 
"MR. WALTER. I do not think so. I think this goes much 
further than that."44 
80 100 CONG. REc. 13997-13998 (1954). 
40 Sept. 13, 1954, p. 5. 
41 He said in a footnote: "Whether or not statements made during general debate 
by individual members of the reporting committee are sufficient to show a congressional 
intent may be open to question. See Jackson, J., concurring in Schwegmann Brothers 
v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 ... ; Note, A Re-evaluation of the Use of 
Legislative History in the Federal Courts, 52 CoL. L. REv. 125." 128 F. Supp. 616 at 627, 
n. 28. 
42 100 CONG. REc. 13325 (1954). 
43 Ibid. Congressman Javits was not a member of the House Judiciary Committee. 
He was one of the 55 who voted against the measure. 100 CoNG. REc. 13333 (1954). 
-!4 Id. at 13325. 
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Thus he ended up taking the same position as Congressman 
Keating on the role of the courts: district judges had to pass upon 
the advisability of proposed grants of immunity. In taking this 
position he did not distinguish between congressional witnesses 
and witnesses before federal courts or grand juries. 
But the Court in the Ullmann case, as had Judge Weinfeld, 
reduced the role of a federal court under paragraph (c), relating 
to a witness before.a federal court or grand jury, simply to that of 
ascertaining whether certain formal requirements had been met 
and if so ordering a witness to testify or produce evidence. Judge 
Weinfeld stressed the fact that paragraph (b) required the "ap-
proval" of a federal district court whereas the following paragraph 
·(c) provided only for the "order" of such a court.45 However, 
if the provision of paragraph (c) that the district attorney "shall 
make application to the court that the witness shall be instructed 
to testify or produce evidence subject to the provisions of this 
section, and upon order of the court such witness shall not be 
excused from testifying or from producing books, papers, or other 
evidence," upon which Judge Weinfeld strongly relied, means no 
more than the Court and he said it did, then it becomes wholly 
unnecessary. It will require courts to do no more than what they 
have always done without it. Courts would have continued to do 
precisely this without any such provision. 
The Court, and Judge Weinfeld, relied on Interstate Com-
merce Commission v. Brimson.46 But ~hat case involved the ap-
plication of compulsion to a witness before an administrative body, 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, and this body did not have 
power to enforce its own subpoena. It had to rely for this purpose 
on a grant of power to a federal court. Such a court, however, 
needs no grant of power to apply compulsion to a witness before 
it or a grand jury under its jurisdiction. It has this power in-
herently. 
In the Brimson case the court truly had nothing to do with the 
determination of the question whether a subpoena ought to issue. 
This was left solely with the commission. Equating the Ullmann 
case with this case means that the quoted portion of paragraph (c) 
was an embellishment which served no other purpose than that 
of deceiving Congress. 
Professor Dixon has shown that at least paragraphs (a) and (b) 
45 128 F. Supp. 616 at 624-625 (1955). 
46154 U.S. 447 (1894). 
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seek to impose on federal courts a nonjudicial function contrary 
to our constitutional requirements for the separation of govern-
mental powers.47 Justice Jackson would have been of the same 
mind. In his The Supreme Court in the American System of 
Government, published posthumously, he described the judicial 
function, and indicated his doubts as to the validity of legislation 
of the type which paragraphs (a) and (b) contain: 
"But perhaps the most significant and least comprehended 
limitation upon the judicial power is that this power extends 
only to cases and controversies. We know that this restriction 
was deliberate, for it was proposed in the Convention that the 
Supreme Court be made a part of a Council of Revision with 
a kind of veto power, and this was rejected. 
"The result of the limitation is that the Court's only power 
is to decide lawsuits between adversary litigants with real 
interests at stake, and its only method of proceeding is by the 
conventional judicial, as distinguished from legislative or ad-
ministrative, process. This precludes the rendering of ad-
visory opinions even at the request of the nation's President 
and every form of pronouncement on abstract, contingent, or 
hypothetical issues. It prevents acceptance for judicial settle-
ment of issues in which the interests and questions involved 
are political in character. It also precludes imposition on 
federal constitutional courts of nonjudicial duties. Recent 
trends to empower judges to grant or deny wiretapping rights 
to a prosecutor or to approve a waiver of prosecution in order 
to force a witness to give self-incriminating testimony raise 
interesting and dubious questions. A federal court can per-
form but one function-that of deciding litigations-and can 
proceed in no manner except by the judicial process."48 
The Court in the Ullmann case expressly left open the question 
whether paragraphs (a) and (b) attempt to confer on federal 
courts a nonjudicial function.49 Judge Weinfeld went a bit farther. 
After quoting these words, "Such an order may be issued by a 
United States district court judge," from paragraph (a), and these 
words, "without first having notified the Attorney General of the 
United States of such action and thereafter having secured the 
approval of the United States district court for the district wherein 
47 Dixon, "The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Federal Immunity Statutes," 
23 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 501, 627 (1955). See also comment, 22 UNIV. CHI. L. R.Ev. 657 (1955). 
48 At 11-12 (1955). 
49 350 U.S. 422 at 431-432 (1956) ("We are concerned here only with § (c) and 
therefore need not pass on this question with respect to §§ (a) and (b) of the Act''). 
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such inquiry is being held," from paragraph (c), and italicizing 
the words "may" and "approval," he continued: "The language 
in these sections of the act purports to vest discretion in the court 
and specifically requires its approval of any grant of immunity."110 
In reaching its conclusions as to paragraph ( c) the Court, as 
had Judge Weinfeld, assumed that paragraphs (a) and (c) were 
separable from it without discussing the question. But there 
would seem to be great doubt about this, for Congress would not 
have passed one part without the other. 
The new federal act consists of but two sections, and of these, 
one deals with the title. The act thus reduces itself to a single 
section. It contains no separability clause. Furthermore, in view 
of the history of the new act and the long struggle between 
Congress and the attorney general over its form, it is clear that 
Congress would not have been satisfied with paragraph (c), which 
the attorney general wanted, if this paragraph had not been ac-
companied by paragraphs (a) and (b), which Congress wanted. 
Whether the invalid parts of an act are separable from the valid 
ones is a question of legislative intent.111 Because of the fact that 
many modem statutes contain a separability clause, the absence 
of such a clause results in the strict application today of a pre-
sumption of indivisibility.52 The leading federal case on separa-
bility and separability clauses is Carter v. Carter Coal Co.113 That 
case involved a separability clause which read: "If any provision 
of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circum-
stances, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the applica-
tion of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall 
not be affected thereby." After quoting it the Court said: "In the 
absence of such a provision, the presumption is that the legislature 
intends an act to be effective as an entirety-that is to say, the rule 
is against the mutilation of a statute; and if any provision be un-
rm 128 F. Supp. 616 at 624 (1955). 
111 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Utah Power &: Light Co. v. Pfost, 
286 U.S. 165 (1932); Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 278 U.S. 235 (1929); Dorchy 
v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924). 
52 See Stern, "Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court," 51 HARv. 
L. REv. 76, 121 (1937). In Family Security Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, (E.D. S.C. 1948) 79 
F. Supp. 62, revd. 336 U.S. 220 (1949), the majority of a three-judge statutory court 
stated (at 65-66): "In view of the modern form of legislative drafting, the omission of 
such a provision evidences clearly the legislative intent that this statute must stand or 
fall as a whole." State cases to this effect are Maury County v. Porter, 195 Tenn. 116, 
257 S.W. (2d) 16 (1953); Life and Casualty Ins. Co. v. McCormack, 174 Tenn. 327, 125 
S.W. (2d) 151 (1939); Burroughs v. Lyles, 142 Tex. 704, 181 S.W. (2d) 570 (1944). 
53 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
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constitutional, the presumption is that the remaining provisions 
fall with it. "54 
A modern statute without a separability clause is not neces-
sarily indivisible. However, the absence of such a clause requires 
the proponents of divisibility to overcome a strong presumption 
against them. Even without the benefit of any presumption one 
can suggest that in the case of the new federal act it affirmatively 
appears that Congress would not have passed paragraph (c) with-
out paragraphs (a) and (b). All three paragraphs should fall 
together. 
Necessity of Protection Against the Danger of State Prosecution 
Another problem which the federal act of August 1954 presents 
involves the question of whether it should, does and can protect 
against the substantial danger of state prosecutions in the area 
which it covers. The Court in the Ullmann case answered the last 
two questions in the affirmative. Judge Weinfeld did likewise, 
but he also answered the first question in the negative. 
In concluding that the federal act did, and constitutionally 
could, protect against state prosecutions it would seem that no 
one gave sufficient consideration to several factors. To begin with, 
the federal act became a part of the federal criminal code. It was 
in the form of an amendment of one of the sections of this code. 
Another section of the same title expressly provides: "Nothing in 
this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of 
the courts of the several States under the laws thereof."CHS This 
provision, as the dissent in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,56 decided a 
week after the Ullmann case, pointed out, is but a recognition of 
the fact that under our federal system the prosecution of offenses 
is committed primarily to the states: "It recognizes the fact that 
maintenance of order and fairness rests primarily with the states."57 
In another recent case, Rochin v. California,58 Justice Frankfurter 
speaking for the Court stated: "In our federal system the adminis-
tration of criminal justice is predominantly committed to the care 
of the states. The power to define crimes belongs to Congress 
Mld. at 312. 
ms 18 u.s.c. (1952) §3231. 
56 350 U.S. 497 (1956), affirming 377 Pa. 58, 104 A. (2d) 133 (1954), revei:sing 172 
Pa. Super. 125, 92 A. (2d) 431 (1952). 
57 350 U.S. 497 at 519 (1956). Justice Reed wrote the dissenting opinion, in which 
Justices Burton and Minton joined. 
118 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
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only as an appropriate means of carrying into execution its limited 
grant of legislative powers."59 But if the new federal act protects 
against state prosecutions then the jurisdiction of state courts· will 
be impaired.60 No one discussed this point. 
In the second place, no one gave sufficient weight to the signifi-
cant difference in wording in the federal act between the prohibi-
tion against prosecution and that against the use of testimony 
given. In the former case the act simply says that "no such witness 
shall be prosecuted"; but in the latter case it provides that no 
testimony which a witness is compelled to give shall be used as 
evidence "in any criminal proceeding . . . against him in any 
court." Such a difference in language has been differently treated 
by the Supreme Court. In Ensign v. Pennsylvania,61 which in-
volved an immunity provision (in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898) 
.simply prohibiting the use of testimony compelled from a bank-
rupt against him "in any criminal proceeding," the Court left 
open the question whether this prohibition included state court 
proceedings. But in Adams v. Maryland,62 which involved the 
very prohibition against the use of c~mpelled testimony "in any 
court"63 that we are here considering, the Court held that the 
prohibition included state courts. Also, Justice Jackson in a con-
curring opinion was careful to point out that the prohibition 
59 Id. at 168. Or as Justice Douglas put it for the Court in Jerome v. United States, 
318 l,J.S. IOI at .104, 105 (1943): " ••. Since there is no common law offense against the 
United States (United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32; United States v. Gradwell, 243 
U.S. 476, 485), the administration of criminal justice under our federal system has 
rested with the states, except as criminal offenses have been explicitly prescribed by 
Congress ..•• " See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 at 412, 413 (1945) ("Apart from 
permitting Congress to use criminal sanctions as means for carrying into execution powers 
granted to it, the Constitution left the domain of criminal justice to the States.") (con-
curring opinion of Justice Frankfurter). The Court adverted to this point in Marcello 
v. United States, (5th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 437 at 443, in sustaining a claim of priv-
ilege before a subcommittee of the Kefauver Committee, although the claim was really 
based on a fear of state prosecution: "It must be remembered also that, in our federal 
system, the administration of criminal justice rests preponderantly with the states." 
60 Cf. Sexton v. California, 189 U.S. 319 (1903); In re Dixon, 41 Cal. (2d) 756, 264 
P. (2d) 513 (1953); Nastasi v. Aderhold, 201 Ga. 237, 39 S.E. (2d) 403 (1946); People 
v. Fury, 279 N.Y. 433, 18 N.E. (2d) 650 (1939); People v. Welch, 141 N.Y. 266, 36 N.E. 
1128 (1894). 
61227 U.S. 592 (1913). Various state cases held that testimony of a bankrupt given 
under this immunity provision was inadmissiblt: in a state court criminal proceeding 
:against him. Clark v. State, 68 Fla. 433, 67 S. 135 (1914); People v. Lay, 193 Mich. 17, 
159 N.W. 299 (1916); People v. Lay, 193 Mich. 476 at 488, 160 N.W. 467 (1916); People 
-v. Donnenfeld, 198 App. Div. 918, 189 N.Y.S. 951 (1921), affd. without opinion, 233 N.Y • 
.526, 135 N.E. 903 (1922); People v. Elliott, 123 Misc. 602, 206 N.Y.S. 54 (1924). 
. 62 347 U.S. 179 (1954). 
63 This prohibition was in 18 U.S.C. (1952) §3486 as it stood before it was amended 
by •the new federal act, and was retained. · · 
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against the use of compelled testimony left "Maryland with com-
plete freedom to prosecute."64 . 
Moreover, the difference in language between the two types of 
prohibition represents a difference in intent on the part of Con-
gress. In the prohibition against use of compelled testimony 
Congress specified "in any court," with the express intent of in-
cluding state courts; but in the prohibition against prosecution 
Congress omitted these words, and did so with the deliberate intent 
of leaving this prohibition ambiguous. The House Report on 
S.16, in discussing the power of Congress to prohibit state prose-
cution, points out: 
"The answer to the·precise question is not too clear .... 
In any event the question can only be resolved by a decision 
of the Supreme Court. Even though the power of Congress 
to prohibit a subsequent State prosecution is doubtful, such 
a constitutional question should not prevent the enactment 
of the recommended bill. The language of the amendment 
that 'no such witness shall be prosecuted. . . ', is sufficiently 
broad to ban a subsequent State prosecution if it be deter-
mined that the Congress has the constitutional power to do 
so. In addition, the amendment recommended provides the 
additional protection-as set forth in the Adams case, by out-
lawing the subsequent use of the compelled testimony in any 
criminal proceeding-State or Federal."65 
In other words what Congress, almost in express language asked 
the Supreme Court to do on the point of the prohibition of state 
prosecution was to legislate: if such a prohibition was constitu-
tional the Court was to rule that it was included; if not, the Court 
was to rule otherwise.- The Court should have left the ambiguous 
prohibition against prosecution just as ineffective as Congress 
made it. 
That the prohibition in the new act against prosecution was 
ambiguous was pointed out on the floor of the House during the 
debate on the measure. Congressman Thomas J. Dodd of Con-
necticut in arguing against S.16 stated: "For example, from a 
reading of it, no one can tell whether the immunity granted ex-
tends to prosecutions in State courts and this is but one of the 
obscurities in the legislation."66 Nevertheless, Congress took no 
64 347 U.S. 179 at 185 (1954). 
611 H.R. R~p. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 7 (1954). 
66 10() CoNG. R.Ec. 13328 (1954). 
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step to meet this objection, which it could easily have done by 
adding the words "in any court": it left the prohibition against 
prosecution ambiguous. 
However, both the Court and the district judge read the 
House Report on S.16 as indicating an intent on the part of Con-
gress to prohibit state prosecution.67 According to the district 
judge such an intent "was expressly stated by the House Com-
mittee."68 It is submitted that the judge is mistaken, and that the 
quoted portion from the House Report demonstrates this. 
The Court pointed out that the prohibition against prosecu-
tion in the new federal act was substantially the same as that in 
the act of 1893,69 sustained in Brown v. Walker. 70 While it is true 
that the Court in that case commented that the act of 1893 "con-
tains no suggestion that it is to be applied only to the Federal 
courts," the Court in the next paragraph went on to say that the 
possibility of prosecution by another sovereignty "is not a real and 
probable danger."71 
In the third place, no one gave sufficient attention to the area 
covered by the new federal act, the area of treason, sedition, sub-
version and sabotage, and the mass of state and local legislation 
in this area. During the past fifty years the states have had more 
legislation in this area than the federal government; and likewise, 
until the Smith Act cases, which only began in 1948, more prose-
cutions.72 
In 1902, the year after Leon Czolgosz, an anarchist, assassi-
nated President McKinley, New York passed a criminal anarchy 
act. Fourteen other states followed in its lead. Immediately after 
World War I some seventeen states adopted criminal syndicalism 
laws. In a single year, 1919, twenty-six states, more than half, 
passed laws against the display of red flags. 
Today all of the states either in their Constitutions or statutes, 
67 350 U.S. 422 at 435 (1956); 128 F. Supp. 617 at 623, 624 (1955). 
68 128 F. Supp. 617 at 624 (1955). 
69 350 U.S. 422 at 434 (1956). 
70 161 U.S. 591 (1896). 
71 Id. at 607, 608. 
72 Four excellent books containing treatments of this field are CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH 
IN THE UNITED STATES 285-438 (1948); EMERSON AND HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 376-600 (1952); THE STATES AND SUBVERSION (Gellhorn ed. 1952): 
DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OF COMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES 241-487, 669-686 
(Fund for the Republic, 1955). The work edited by Gellhorn contains presentations by 
six persons, Barrett, Harsha, Prendergast, Mowitz, Chamberlain and Countryman, of the 
activities against subversion in six states, California, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New 
York and Washington. 
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and often in both, have provisions defining treason. Thirty-three 
states prohibit misprision of treason. Nineteen states and Hawaii 
have criminal anarchy statutes; of these states four also make it 
a crime knowingly to attend an assemblage of persons defined as 
criminal anarchists, or to permit an assemblage of such persons 
on one's premises. Twenty jurisdictions, including Alaska and 
Hawaii, have statutes on criminal syndicalism; of which statutes 
fourteen also forbid participation in meetings and permitting 
such meetings on one's premises. Thirty-five states have laws pro-
hibiting the display of certain types of flags and other emblems. 
Thirty-three jurisdictions, including Alaska and Hawaii, have 
sedition statutes. Twenty-eight states have provisions against in-
surrection and rebellion. Thirty-two jurisdictions, including 
Alaska and Hawaii, have some form of statute dealing with sabo-
tage. Fifteen jurisdictions, including Hawaii, have on their books, 
often with some variations or modifications, the Model Sabotage 
Prevention Act, which was drafted in 1941 after the Federal-State 
Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense, 
held under the auspices of the Department of Justice, the Inter-
state Commission on Crime, the National Association of Attorneys 
General, the Governors' Conference, and the Council of State 
Governments. In addition, various of the states have registration 
statutes, provisions for loyalty oaths, teachers' loyalty statutes, and 
laws excluding communists and subversives from elective office, 
from public office, and from state employment.73 
In 1949 Maryland enacted a comprehensive and drastic stat-
ute against subversion, the Ober Law, formally designated as the 
Subversive Activities Act of 1949, and New York passed an act for 
further insuring the loyalty of its teachers, the Feinberg Law, 
which provided for the preparation of a black list of organizations. 
During the next few years eight states, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Washing-
ton, followed Maryland's lead and put on their statute books acts 
modeled in substantial parts in the Ober Law.74 Ten states, 
73 These acts are listed in DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OF COMMUNISM IN THE 
UNITED STATES 241-451 (Fund for the Republic, 1955), and THE STATES AND SUBVERSION, 
App. B., 414-440 (Gellhorn ed. 1952). 
74 Fla. Stat. (1955) §§876.22 to 876.31; Ga. Code Ann. (1953; Supp. 1955) §§26-90la 
to 26-914a; La. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1954) §§14.366 to 14.380; Miss. Code (Supp. 1954) 
§§4046-01 to 4064-12; N.H. Rev. Stat. (1955) §§588.l to 588.16 and (Supp. 1955) §§588.3-a, 
588.3-b; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, Supp. 1956) §§2921.21 to 2921.27; Pa. Stat. Ann. 
(Purdon, Supp. 1955) tit. 65, §§211 to 225; Wash. Rev. Code (1951; Supp. July 1953) 
§§9.81.010 to 9.81.130. 
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Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Montana, New Mexico, South Carolina and Texas passed regis-
tration acts or elaborated existing ones.75 The acts of Alabama, 
Arkansas, Delaware, Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico and Texas 
referred specifically to the Communist Party. The Delaware 
statute requires every communist or front member who resides 
in or passes through the state to register. Four states, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Texas, passed laws which out-
lawed the Communist Party by name.76 
Beginning in 1950 a hundred or more cities and counties 
across the country adopted measures against subversion. The list 
included: Bessemer and Birmingham, Alabama; Los Angeles, 
Oakland and Redondo Beach, California; Jacksonville and Miami,-
Florida; Atlanta and Macon, Georgia; Indianapolis and Terre 
Haute, Indiana; Cumberland, Maryland; Detroit and Saginaw, 
Michigan; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Omaha, Nebraska; Jersey 
City, New Jersey; New Rochelle, New York; Cincinnati, Colum-
bus and Lorain, Ohio; Erie, Lancaster, McKeesport and York, 
Pennsylvania; Knoxville, Tennessee; and Tacoma and Seattle, 
Washington. Los Angeles, California and New Rochelle, New 
York by ordinance required registration with the police of any 
member of a "communist organization" who "resides in, is em-
ployed in, has a regular place of business in, or who regularly 
enters or travels through any part" of the city. Birmingham, 
Alabama by ordinance imposed a fine and imprisonment for each 
day that a known communist remained in the city. A Jacksonville, 
Florida ordinance made it unlawful for any Communist Party 
member to be within the city limits during the period of hostili-
ties in Korea. A Seattle, Washington ordinance made it unlawful 
for any subversive organization to rent or use the Civic Audito-
rium. Various ordinances of other cities prohibited advocacy, 
required the registration of communists and subversives, forbade 
75 Ala. Code (Supp. 1955) tit. 14, §§97 (I) to 97 (8); Ark. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955) 
§§41-4125 to 41-4127; Cal. Corp. Code (Deering, 1953) §§35000 to 35302; Del. Code Ann. 
(Supp. 1954) tit. 20, §§3501 to 3503; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1954) §§14-358 to 14-365; 
Mich. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1954) §§752.321 to 752.332; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Supp. 
1955) §§94-4411 to 94-4427; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) §§4-15-1 to 4-15-3; S.C. Code (1952) 
§§16-581 to 16-589; Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, Supp. 1956) §§6889-3, 3A. 
76 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1956) §§10-5201 to 10-5209; Mass. Ann. Laws (1956) c. 
264, §§16 to 23; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1955) tit. 18, §3811; Tex. Civ. Stat. 
(Vernon, Supp. 1956) §6889-3A. Sections 16A and 17 of the Massachusetts act provide: 
"The Communist Party is hereby declared to be a subversive organization" and "A sub• 
versive organization is hereby declared to be unlawful." 
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the use of certain types of flags, and provided for loyalty oaths. 
Many cities prescribed loyalty oaths for their employees. Los 
Angeles and Detroit set up administrative procedures for deter-
mining the loyalty of their employees.77 
Various of the states, Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, 
Montana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York, Ohio, Washington, and Hawaii, have set up committees or 
commissions to investigate un-American activities. Of these bodies 
the most active have been the Tenney Committee in California; 
the Broyles Commission in Illinois; the Lusk (1919-20) and Rapp-
Coudert Committees in New York; and the Canwell Committee 
in the state of Washington.78 
Not only have the states had all manner of measures in the 
area covered by the new federal act, but they have also brought 
many prosecutions under various of the statutes to which refer-
ence has been made. Most of these prosecutions of course did not 
go to reviewing courts. Of the few that did, a still smaller number 
reached the United States Supreme Court. There, although a 
number of these statutes were invalidated,79 a number of others 
were sustained. While it is true that in the most recent decision, 
Pennsylvania v. Nelson,80 the Court ruled against the validity of 
a Pennsylvania sedition law, and cast doubt on such laws of other 
states, on the ground that the federal Smith Act pre-empted the 
field, the Court was careful to confine its ruling to that field. The 
prosecution in that case was for sedition, not against Pennsylvania. 
but against the United States. Chief Justice Warren writing for 
the Court took pains to point out the boundaries of the opinion: 
". . . Neither does it limit the right of the state to protect itself 
at any time against sabotage or attempted violence of all kinds. 
77 For a description of these measures see EMERSON AND HABER, PoLmCAL AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 599 (1952); THE STATES AND SUBVERSION 382-383 (Ge1Ihom 
ed. 1952). Many of these ordinances are reproduced in DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OF 
COMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES 455-488 (Fund for The Republic, 1955). 
78 The activities of these bodies were described by Barrett, Harsha, Chamberlain, 
and Countryman in THE STATES AND SUBVERSION (Ge1Ihorn ed. 1952). 
79 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (Pennsylvania sedition act); Wieman 
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (Oklahoma statute prescribing loyalty oath for state 
officers and employees); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (Georgia statute against 
insurrection as applied); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (Oregon criminal syn-
dicalism law as applied); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (California red 
flag law); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (Kansas criminal syndicalism statute as 
applied). 
so 350 U.S. 497 (1956). 
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Nor does it prevent the state from prosecuting where the same 
act constitutes both a Federal offense and a state offense under 
the police power .... "81 
In earlier cases the Court sustained the validity of various state 
statutes dealing with subversion. It upheld the constitutionality of 
three of New York's statutes, two of them in prosecutions: the 
criminal anarchy act of 1902 in Git low v. New Y ork;82 its regis-
tration act in New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman;83 and the 
Feinberg Law in Adler v. Board of Education.84 The Court up-
held a Minnesota sedition act in a criminal prosecution in Gilbert 
v. Minnesota; 85 and the California criminal syndicalism act in 
criminal prosecutions in Whitney v. California86 and Burns v. 
United States.81 The Court, in Gamer v. Board of Public Works,88 
sustained the validity of the oath requirements which Los Angeles 
prescribed by ordinance for its office holders and employees; and, 
in Gerende v. Board of Supervisors,89 on a restricted interpreta-
tion of what the law required, held valid an oath provision of 
Maryland's Ober Law. 
Not only do the states have a multitude of measures against 
subversion and not only have there been many prosecutions under 
these provisions, but also the states are going to insist on what 
they deem their rights and powers to proceed with further such 
prosecutions. Indeed, of late, state officials have increasingly urged 
that the states play an even greater role than heretofore in the 
fight against subversion. Moreover, Attorney General Brownell 
has encouraged state action in this field. 
In Pennsylvania v. Nelson,90 when Pennsylvania petitioned 
the federal Supreme Court for certiorari, four states, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Texas, filed briefs as amid 
curiae supporting the petitioner; and the attorneys general of 
twenty-four states, including Massachusetts, joined in the brief of 
81 Id. at 500. 
82268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
113 278 U.S. 63 (1928). 
84 342 U.S. 485 (1952). 
85 254 U .s. 325 (1920). 
86 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
87 274 U.S. 328 (1927). 
88 341 U.S. 716 (1951). 
89 341 U.S. 56 (1951). 
90 350 U.S. 497 (1956). 
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the state of New Hampshire.91 The United States too, after the 
Court's invitation to the solicitor general for the views of the 
federal government, filed a brief amicus curiae in which it sup-
ported the validity of Pennsylvania's sedition law. In this brief 
the United States, after pointing out that, 
" ... Forty-two states plus Alaska and Hawaii have statutes 
which prohibit advocacy of the violent overthrow of estab-
lished government. Most of these statutes have been in exist-
ence for many years .... 
". . . Every state has made provisions for treason either in 
its constitution or statutes, often in both .... 
" ... As of January 1955, some 30 states plus Alaska and 
Hawaii had sedition laws on their statute books, and 12 others 
had either criminal syndicalism or criminal anarchy statutes 
or both, making a total of 42 states plus Alaska and Hawaii 
which had criminal legislation in this general field .... "92 
took the position: 
". . . Moreover the problem of subversion, as we think 
Congress recognized, is of such magnitude as to invite fed-
eral-state cooperation in the enforcement of their respective 
sedition laws. Thus the Attorney General of the United 
States recently informed the attorneys general of the several 
states in this connection that a full measure of federal-state 
cooperation would be in the public interest."93 
The role of the states in the fight against subversion was also 
one of the main topics of discussion at the 1954 and 1955 con-
ferences of the National Association of Attorneys General, an 
association comprised of the attorneys general of all the states and 
... territories. At the 1954 conference Attorney General Louis C. 
Wyman of New Hampshire asserted that the states had a place 
in the fight against subversion alongside the federal government.94 
He said that a state investigation, properly conducted would 
supplement the work of the F .B.I. and other federal agencies 
91348 U.S. 814 (1954). The states were Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington and "Wisconsin. 
92 Brief, pp. 5, 15, 22. 
93 Brief, p. 31. 
94For an account of this session see N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1954, p. 16:4-6. 
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engaged in the .enforcement of security statutes. He· described the 
procedures under New Hampshire's legislation against subver-
sion,95 and referred to various New Hampshire cases96 which, in 
his opinion, supported the view that this legislation did not conflict 
with federal statutes. A committee headed by the attorney general 
of Massachusetts presented a report recommending that the 
association in its fight against subversion set up a standing 
committee to interchange information and ideas with the legis-
lative and executive branches of the federal government. 
At the 1955 conference Mr. Wyman declared that it was 
"sheerest nonsense" to say that the federal government had the 
exclusive right to investigate subversive activities within the 
states. He was apprehensive of the possible influence "of the 
smiles and blandishments of Communist diplomats." If this 
resulted in "further curbing of the Federal security program," the 
attorneys general of the states were to see to it that state security 
programs were "not so susceptible to seduction."97 
The association's committee on subversive activities recom-
mended that each state set up a permanent division of subversive 
activities in its state police system to cooperate with the local police 
and the Federal Bureau· of Investigation.98 The association ap-
proved a resolution urging its members to take such action as they 
deemed compatible with the interests of their own states in the 
promotion of national security.99 
Indeed, the attorneys general were not satisfied that the states 
should have simply a share in the. struggle against subversion: 
they wanted an immunity act which would protect witnesses in 
state cases against the danger of federal prosecution. State prose-
cutors had complained that their investigations had been ham-
pered b_y the fact that witnesses who might have given valuable 
95 N.H. Rev. Stat. (1955) §§588.1 to 588.16 (Subversive Activities Act of 1951); N.H. 
Laws 1953, c. 307, p. 524 at 525 (joint resolution directing the attorney general "to make 
full and complete investigation with respect to violations of the subversive activities act 
of 1951 and to determine whether subversive persons as defined in said act are presently 
located within this state," and "to proceed with criminal prosecutions under the sub-
versive activities act whenever evidence presented to him in the course of the investigation 
indicates violations thereof," and "to report to the 1955 session on the first day of its regu-
lar session the results of this investigation, together with his recommendations, if any, for 
necessary legislation''). 
96 See, e.g., Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 105 A. (2d) 756 (1954), sustaining the 
validity of the legislation cited in the preceding note. 
97 N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1955, p. 23:1. 
98Ibid. 
99 N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1955, p. 19:2-3. 
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information under grant of state immunity were reluctant to do 
so because of fears of federal prosecution. The attorneys general 
after a sharp debate approved by a vote of 23 to 14 a resolution 
for the enactment of a law that would grant immunity from 
federal prosecution to witnesses who would receive immunity in 
state cases involving subversion.100 
It was at this conference that Attorney General Brownell 
assured the attorneys general of the states that the department of 
justice did not regard the country's internal security as the ex-
clusive prerogative of the federal government. He advised them 
that the government would take this position in its amicus curiae 
brief in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, and added, "We believe that state 
sedition laws should be enforced and that a full measure of 
Federal-state cooperation will be in the public interest."101 The 
following month the government filed its brief, in which it took 
this position. 
Despite the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. 
Nelson and its denial of a petition for rehearing,102 the contro-
versy which this decision raised has by no means come to an end. 
The attorneys general of thirty-four states and the territory of 
Alaska joined Pennsylvania in its petition for rehearing.103 Im-
mediately after the Court's decision Representative Howard W. 
Smith of Virginia, the principal draftsman of _the Smith Act, and 
other members of Congress who were members in 1940 and voted 
for it, publicly stated that they never intended supersession of 
state laws.104 Congressman Smith called for a law which would 
permit the states to proceed with prosecutions under their own 
sedition laws. He had introduced a broad bill to cover this situa-
tion after the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.105 
The Subversive Activities Liaison Committee of the National 
Association of Attorneys General adopted a resolution urging 
amendatory legislation; and Senator Styles Bridges of New 
Hampshire and later Congressman Walter introduced bills simi-
100 Id. at col. 3. 
101 Id. at col. 1-2. 
102 351 U.S. 934 (1956). 
103 The states were Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin· and 
Wyoming. 
104 Petition for Rehearing, p. 4; N.Y. TIMES, April 4, 1956, p. 16: 6. 
105 H.R. 3, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955). 
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lar to, but more narrowly dra·wn than, Congressman Smith's bill.100 
Senator Bridges' bill had the co-sponsorship of fourteen other 
senators, eleven Republicans and three Democrats, and both bills 
had the endorsement of the Department of Justice. Deputy Attor-
ney General Rogers wrote to Senator James A. Eastland of 
Mississippi, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and to 
Congressman Emanual Geller of New York, chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee: 
"It is the view of the Department of Justice that in the 
fields of sedition and subversion, the Federal and State 
Governments can work together easily and well .... This 
legislation would clearly express the congressional intent that 
such cooperation between the Federal and State Governments 
in this field is to be encouraged. 
"The Department of Justice favors enactment of the 
bill."101 
The National Association of Attorneys General by a vote of 
31 to 10 approved a resolution in favor of the "enactment of Fed-
eral legislation authorizing the enforcement of state statutes 
prescribing criminal penalties for subversive activities involving 
state or national governments or either of them";108 and t;he 
Conference of Governors at its 48th annual meeting by what was 
described as an almost unanimous vote adopted a resolution which 
"recommended to the Congress that Federal laws should be so 
framed that they will not be construed to pre-empt any field 
against state action unless this intent is stated .... "109 The Senate 
Judiciary Committee approved Senator Bridges' bill, and the 
House Judiciary Committee Congressman Smith's bill,11° with an 
amendment to make it identical with that of Congressman Walter, 
but the Congress did not get to the passage of one of them. How-
ever, the opposition of the states to federal action which trespasses 
106 S. 3617, H.R. 11341, 84th Cong., 2d sess. (1956); 102 CoNG. REc. 5473-5474 (April 
11, 1956). The concern of many members of Congress over what they regard as federal 
encroachment on the reserved powers of the states has resulted in the introduction of 
some 70 measures affecting federal courts which have been referred to the Senate or 
House Judiciary Committees. See N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1956, p. 25:1. 
101 S. Rep. 2117, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 3 (1956); H.R. Rep. 2576, 84th Cong. 2d sess., 5 
(1956). The fourteen senators who co-sponsored Senator Bridges' bill were Messrs. Martin 
(Pa.), Cotton, Knowland, Daniel, Bricker, McClellan, Jenner, Welker, McCarthy, Sten-
nis, Hruska, Saltonstall, Carlson and Potter. 
108 N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1956, p. 19:2. 
109 N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1956, p. 1:5, p. 20:6. 
110 S. Rep. 2117, H.R. Rep. 2576, 84th Cong., 2d sess. (1956). 
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on their reserved powers has been aroused, and their resistance 
to such action will continue and probably even increase. 
Moreover, the area covered by the new federal immunity act 
is so large that it involves the police power of the states to a great 
extent, and the Supreme Court has ruled repeatedly that the 
"intention of Congress to exclude States from exercising their 
police power must be clearly manifested."111 If Congress intended 
the new federal act to protect against the danger of state prosecu-
tion, it should have put that intent into express language. It did 
not do so. 
If one considers the state legislation in the area covered by the 
new federal act, the prosecutions which have taken place under 
this legislation, and the mounting determination on the part of 
the states to be included in the struggle against subversion, one 
cannot dismiss as lightly as either the Court or the district judge 
did the point that if the federal act contains a prohibition against 
state prosecutions it may then violate the Tenth Amendment, 
which provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
to the States respectively, or to the people." One can certainly 
make a strong argument that subversion covers such a large area 
that some of it is bound to be within the scope of reserved powers 
beyond the reaeh of Congress. Indeed, in Pennsylvania v. Nelson 
the Court specifically excluded from the scope of its opinion 
sabotage, attempted violence of all kinds, and offenses under the 
police power of the states.112 In Burns v. United States118 the 
Court indicated that the punishment of those who intentionally 
111 International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 al 
253 (1949). For further illustrations see Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937); Reid v. 
Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902). In Kelly v. Washington, the Court said, speaking through 
Chief Justice Hughes (at 10): "The principle is thoroughly established that the exer-
cise by the State of its police power, which would be valid if not superseded by federal 
action, is superseded only where the repugnance or conflict is 'so direct and positive' 
that the two acts cannot 'be reconciled or consistently stand together.' " In Reid v. 
Colorado, the Court ruled (at 148): "It should never be held that Congress intends to 
supersede or by its legislation suspend the exercise of the police powers of the States, 
even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect that result is clearly manifested.'' 
In Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), where the Court sustained the use of 
wiretap evidence in a state court proceeding, the Court said (at 202-203): " ... If Congress 
is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intention clearly. It will not be 
presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the exercise of the power 
of the state unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The exercise 
of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed." 
112 350 U.S. 493 at 500 (1956). See note, 66 HARV. L. REv. 327 (1952). 
113 274 U.S. 328 at 331 (1927). 
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destroyed or damaged the property of others was within the prov-
ince of the states. Such destruction or damage is involved in either 
sabotage or insurrection. In an early ~se, the Court, after advert-
ing hypothetically to a local insurrection, stated: "In such cases the 
State has inherently the right to· use all the means necessary to 
put down the resistance to its authority, and restore peace, order, 
and obedience to law."114 The states would likewise seem to have 
the power to punish those who swore falsely under a state statute 
requiring loyalty oaths of state employees or office holders,115 or 
a municipal ordinance with a similar requirement.116 
The Tenth Amendment point gains further support from the 
fact that the prosecution of offenses is primarily the concern of 
the states.117 
Attorney General Wyman of New Hampshire in that state's 
amicus curiae brief in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,118 joined by the 
attorneys general of twenty-four other states, made the Tenth 
Amendment his basis for asserting: "Congress lacks constitutional 
power to supersede either expressly or by implication the States' 
reserved right to make criminal within their border acts seeking 
overthrow of their own government by force and violence."119 
At the 1955 conference of the National Association of Attorneys 
General he enlarged his position, and challenged the power of 
Congress, under the Tenth Amendment, "to take from the states 
their reserve power to seek to find out who within their borders 
conspires to overthrow" either a state or the federal government.120 
It is also relevant to observe that we are in a period of time 
when there is an emphasis on states' rights. In August 1956 at the 
79th annual meeting of the American Bar Association the domi-
nant note in the welcoming speech of Governor Allan Shivers of 
Texas and in the address of the association's president, E. Smythe 
Gambrell, was that concentration of power in the federal govern-
ment threatened to destroy states' rights. Governor Shivers wel-
comed the members of the association "to a state whose people 
believe in the Tenth Amendment." Mr. Gambrell declared that 
in the "clamor of controversy" over the first eight amendments 
to the Constitution "our people seem to have overlooked the 
114 White v. Hart, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 646 at 650-651 (1871). 
115 See Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951). 
116 See Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). 
117 See notes 57-59 supra. 
118 348 U.S. 814 (1954). 
110 Brief, p. 16. 
120 N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1955, p. 23:1. 
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Ninth and Tenth Amendments."121 In the same month the 
speakers at the Conference of Chief Justices, composed of the 
highest judicial officers of the forty-eight states, took up the same 
theme.122 In part this emphasis on states' rights may be the result 
of the discussions which have been taking place about world gov-
ernment and the powers, if any, that international organizations 
ought to have over national states. With national states seeking 
to preserve their sovereignties the states within our federal union 
have been stressing their reserved powers. And the pendulum has 
been swinging toward them. For instance they won out on the 
issue of ownership of tidelands oil.123 They may yet win by legis-
lation on the issue involved in Pennsylvania v. N elson.124 
With the states contending vigorously for their part in the 
struggle against subversion, and with subversion covering a 
territory so extensive that it includes such diverse items as injury 
to property on the one hand and false loyalty oaths on the other, 
it is difficult to see how the entire area constitutionally can be held 
to be within the scope of a federal immunity act which prohibits 
state prosecutions. In any event, since Congress deliberately left 
the prohibition against prosecution ambiguous, the Court should 
not have increased the prohibition to include state prosecution. 
Judge Weinfeld was also of the opinion, relying on United 
States v. M urdock,125 that the new federal act did not need to pro-
121 N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1956, p. 1:4. 
122 N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1956, p. 13:1. 
123 See Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1956) §§1301-
1315; Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954). 
124 In the meantime, however, the highest courts of two states have invalidated state 
sedition indictments. Braden v. Commonwealth, (Ky. 1956) 291 S.W. (2d) 843; Com-
monwealth v. Gilbert, (Mass. 1956) 134 N.E. (2d) 13. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hood, (Mass. 
1956) 134 N.E. (2d) 12. State courts in Massachusetts quashed state sedition indictments 
against a total of eight persons, including Prof. Dirk Struik, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology mathematician. N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1956, p. 6:1. 
12:; 284 U.S. 141 (1931). In United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Im-
migration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927), the Court, after holding that a claim of privilege had 
not been made in that case, went on to say (at 113) that this conclusion made it unneces-
sary "to consider the extent to which the 5th Amendment guarantees immunity from 
self-incrimination under state statutes .•.• " 
A number of lower federal courts sustained a cl~im of privilege where the basis for 
it was the danger of state prosecution. United States v. Lombardo, (W.D. Wash. 1915) 
228 F. 980, affd. on another ground 241 U.S. 73 (1916); In re Gasteiger, (E.D.N.Y. 1923) 
290 F. 410; In re Hooks Smelting Co., (E.D. Pa. 1905) 138 F. 954; In re Hess, (E.D. Pa. 1905) 
134 F. 109; In re Kanter, (S.D.N.Y. 1902) 117 F. 356; In re Nachman, (D.C.S.C. 1902) 
114 F. 995; In re Franklin Syndicate, (E.D.N.Y. 1900) 114 F. 205; In re Feldstein, (S.D.N.Y. 
1900) 103 F. 269; In re Scott, (W.D. Pa. 1899) 95 F. 815; In re Graham, (S.D.N.Y. 
1876) 10 Fed. Cas. 913, No. 5659; Buckeye Powder Co. v. Hazard Powder Co., (D.C. Conn. 
1913) 205 F. 827 at 829. 
District Judge Woolsey in sustaining a claim of privilege in 1930, in In re Doyle, 
(S.D.N.Y. 1930) 42 F. (2d) 686, made a careful review of the authorities, quoting the 
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tect against the danger of state prosecution. It is submitted that 
the Murdock case has come to be overestimated. 
Under Counselman v. Hitchcock,126 a;n immunity act, to be 
valid, must give a protection that is coextensive with the privilege 
accorded -by the Fifth Amendment. This would seem to mean, 
under our close-knit federal system, that a federal immunity act to 
be constitutional would have to protect against prosecution under 
state laws wherever the danger of such prosecution is of the same 
substantiality as prosecution under federal laws. Our federal and 
state governments are but parts of one integrated governmental 
system. Taken together they form the government of one federal 
state. It would therefore seem that a federal immunity act would 
have to protect against the danger of state prosecution to the same 
extent that it protects against the danger of federal prosecution. 
A good illustration of the measure of protection that is neces-
sary against federal prosecution may be found in Heike v. United 
States.121 There the defendant pleaded in bar to an indictment 
for frauds on the revenue the immunity provision in an act 
aimed at the correction of certain corporate abuses. He had 
previously testified in a grand jury investigation into possible 
violations of the Sherman anti-trust act. During the course of 
this testimony he had produced a table showing how many 
pounds of sugar his company had melted during a certain period 
of time. Some of this sugar was also involved in the fraud case. 
But the Court held that the immunity provision did not protect 
him, saying through Justice Holmes: 
". . ; We see no reason for supposing that the act offered. 
a gratuity to crime. It should be construed, s_o far as its words 
fairly allow the construction, as coterminous with what other-
wise would have been the privilege of the person concerned .... 
". . . When the statute speaks of testimony concerning a 
matter it means concerning it in a substantial way, just as the 
constitutional protection is confined to real danger, and does 
opinion in United States v. Saline Bank, 1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 100 (1828), and two pertinent 
paragraphs from Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906). However, he was reversed on 
appeal, without opinion. United States v. Doyle, (2d Cir. 1931) 47 F. (2d) 1086. Shortly 
after the decision on appeal the federal government nolleprossed an indictment against 
Doyle. Comment, 41 YALE L. J. 618 at 622 (1932). The Doyle in this case was the same 
one who was involved in Matter of Doyle, 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489 (1931). 
For a recent dictum in accord with Judge Weinfeld's opinion see George v. Lindberg, 
(D.C. Minn. 1956) 138 F. Supp. 77 at 80. 
126142 U.S. 547 (1892). 
121 227 U.S. 131 '(1913). 
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not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course 
of law .... "128 
It would thus seem that a federal immunity provision should 
extend this measure of protection against the danger not only 
of federal but _also state prosecution. Indeed, such a formulation 
will reconcile the results in all the Supreme Court cases as 
well as most of the various statements in the opinions. 
In two of the first cases dealing with the danger of state 
prosecution the Supreme Court held that such a danger did 
provide the basis for a claim of privilege. In one case, United 
States v. Saline Bank,12° the opinion was by Chief Justice Marshall, 
and in the other, Ballmann v. Fagin,130 by Justice Holmes. The 
former case involved a creditors' bill for discovery and other 
relief and a plea that the discovery would subject the defendants 
to penalties under a Virginia statute which prohibited unin-
corporated banks. The Court sustained the plea: "The rule 
clearly is, that a party is not bound to make any discovery which 
would expose him to penalties, and this case falls within it."131 
In the .latter case a claim of privilege included reliance on an 
Ohio statute which made it a crime to operate a "bucket shop." 
The Court ruled for the accused: "According to United States v. 
Saline Bank ... he was exonerated from disclosures which would 
have exposed him to the penalties of the state law."132 
In the same term as Ballmann v. Fagin there were two de-
cisions which have been taken as pointing in an opposite direc-
tion to that case. However, Justice Holmes, who wrote the opin-
ion in Ballmann v. Fagin, sat in both of those cases and dissented 
in neither. One of them, Hale v. Henkel,133 did not involve the 
problem at all: it held that an agent or officer of a corporation 
may not claim the right of silence on its behalf. 
The other, Jack v. Kansas,134 involving an immunity provi-
sion of an antitrust act of the state of Kansas, may be explained 
128 Id. at 142, 144. In Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917), the Court ruled 
that a valid claim of privilege must be based on a real danger of prosecution. 
120 1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 100 (1828). 
130 200 U.S. 186 (1906). 
1311 Pet. (26 U.S.) 100 at 104 (1828). 
132 200 U.S. 186 at 195 (1906). This statement has been called a dictum, United 
States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 at 396 (1933); Melltzer, "Required Records, the McCarran 
Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination," 18 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 687 at 688, n. 
11 (1951); and apparently a dictum, United States v. DiCarlo, (N.D. Ohio 1952) 102 F. 
Supp. 597 at 604. But it is submitted- that it is one of the alternative grounds of decision. 
133 201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
134 199 U.S. 372 (1905), affirming 69 Kan. 387, 76 P. 911 (1904). 
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on the ground of the remoteness of the danger of federal prosecu-
tion. The state court, after pointing out that the inquiries in 
that case were limited to intrastate transactions, and discussing 
Brown v. Walker}3 5 concluded that the possibility that the de-
fendant's answers might disclose violations of the federal anti-
trust law "was not a real and probable danger."136 The United 
States Supreme Court agreed. 
A little earlier, in Brown v. Walker, supra, the first federal 
Supreme Court decision sustaining the constitutionality of an 
immunity act, the Court, in answer to an objection that the federal 
act there involved did not grant immunity from state prosecution, 
stated: 
"But even granting that there were still a bare possibility 
that by his disclosure he might be subjected to the criminal 
laws of some other sovereignty, that, as Chief Justice Cock-
burn said in Queen v. Boyes, I B. & S. 311, in reply to the 
argument that the witness was not protected by his pardon 
against an impeachment by the House of Commons, is not 
a real and probable danger, with reference to the ordinary 
operations of the law in the ordinary courts, but 'a danger of 
an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference 
to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so 
improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influ-
ence his conduct.' Such dangers it was never the object of the 
provision to obviate.''137 
Thus the law stood until United States v. Murdock, supra, 
a case which has been regarded as establishing the proposition 
that a federal immunity act need not protect against state prosecu-
tion. But that case, too, may be explained upon the ground that 
there was no real danger of state prosecution. The· defendant 
in each of two federal income tax returns had deducted $12,000 
which he claimed to have paid to others. A revenue agent 
wanted him to name the recipients. He declined and claimed 
his privilege. That there was no real danger of state prosecu-
tion is indicated in this language of the Court: "The plea does 
not rest upon any claim that the inquiries were being made to 
discover evidence of crime against state law. Nothing of state 
concern was involved. The investigation was under federal law 
in respect of federal matters. The information sought ·was appro-
135 161 U.S. 591 (1896). 
136 69 Kan. 387 at 405 (1904). 
137 161 U.S. 591 at 608 (1896). 
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priate to enable the Bureau to ascertain whether appellee had in 
fact made deductible payments in each year as stated in his 
return, and also to determine the tax liability of the recipients."138 
However, the Court did say, among other things: "The 
English rule of evidence against compulsory self-incrimination, 
on which historically that contained in the Fifth Amendment 
rests, does not protect witnesses against disclosing offenses in 
violation of the laws of another country .... "139 
But in neither of the two English cases which the Court 
cited for this proposition was there any real danger of prosecu-
tion by any country. One of the cases, Queen v. Boyes,140 did 
not involve another jurisdiction at all. There the defendant 
took the position that a pardon from the Crown did not take 
away the recipient's right of silence for the reason that it was 
not pleadable to an impeachment by the House of Commons. 
The court held against the defendant on the ground that the 
danger of such an impeachment was imaginary and unsubstantial. 
In the other case, King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox,141 
agents of a revolutionary government in Sicily bought a vessel 
in England and registered her in the name of two English 
subjects. The king of the Two Sicilies brought a bill for dis-
covery. The defendants, none of whom was in Sicily, pleaded 
that their production of the requested documents would expose 
them to criminal prosecution in Sicily. Again there was no 
real danger of prosecution, and the court ruled against the de-
fendants. 
Today, for instance, if a witness in this country were to 
claim a right of silence on the ground that his answer might 
incriminate him in Russia, no court would pay any attention 
to it. But if a witness before a congressional committee or a 
federal court or grand jury were to claim his privilege on the 
ground of substantial danger of state prosecution why should 
his claim not be respected? 
In the later English case of United States v. McRae142 
188284 U.S. 141 at 149 (1931). 
189Ibid. 
HO 1 B. &: S. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (1861). 
m 19 L. J. (n.s.) (Ch.) 202 (1850), 20 L. J. (n.s.) (Ch.) 417 (1851), 7 St. Tr. 
(n.s.) 1049 (1850-1851). 
142 L.R. 4 Eq. 327 (1867), affirmed on the point of the claim of privilege, L.R. 3 Ch. 
79 (1867). Cf. East India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Ves. Sr. 246, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (1749). But 
see In re Atherton, [1912] 2 K.B. 251 at 253-254, a case arising out of the public examina-
tion of a bankrupt, an area in which the English courts have not given a due regard 
to the right of silence. 
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involving a bill for discovery by the United States against a 
confederate agent, both the lower court and the Court of Appeal , 
in Chancery ruled for the defendant on the ground that to 
compel him to make discovery might expose him to a forfeiture 
in the United States, another international state. Both courts 
distinguished King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, and restricted 
any language in the opinion in that case to the actual holding. 
Referring to that case, Lord Chancellor Chelmsford in the McRae 
case said: "There it was not- she,;vn that the Defendants had 
rendered themselves liable to criminal prosecution. . . . There 
it was doubtful whether the Defendants would ever be within 
the reach of a prosecution .... "143 Indeed, it was the decision 
in the McRae case which produced the second federal immunity 
act, the act of 1868,144 later Rev. Stat., section 860. The English 
law thus goes further than the position we are urging, for it 
extends the protection of the privilege to cover the danger of 
a prosecution or infliction of a penalty by a foreign state, where-
as we are asking no more than that the privilege cover the danger, 
and a substantial one, of a prosecution by another govern-
mental unit of the same federal state. 
After citing King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox and Queen 
v. ·Boyes, the Court in the Murdock case went on to say that 
immunity from state prosecution was not essential for the validity 
of a federal immunity act and a lack of state power ·to protect 
against federal prosecution did not defeat a state immunity 
statute. For these propositions the Court cited Counselman v. 
Hitchcock,145 Brown v. Walker,146 Jack v. Kansas,141 and Hale 
v. Henkel.148 As we have already seen, in only two of these 
cases, Brown v. ·Walker and Jack v. Kansas, was the problem 
involved; and in both of these cases the danger of prosecution 
by another jurisdiction was so remote that it was ·not entitled 
to serious consideration.149 
143 L.R. 3 Ch. 79 at 87 (1867). 
144 15 Stat. 37 (1868). 
145 142 U.S. 547 (1892). 
146161 U.S. 591 (1896). 
147 199 U.S. 372 (1905). 
148201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
149 Murdock was subsequently convicted, but his conviction was reversed for the 
double reason that the judge in the circumstances of that case expressed an opinion as 
to the defendant's guilt and refused to give a requested charge on willfulness.· United 
States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933), affirming (7th Cir. 1932) 62 F. (2d) 926. 
A good discussion of the problem presented in the Murdock case may be found in Grant, 
"Immunity from Compulsory Self-Incrimination in a Federal System of Government," 
9 TEMP. L.Q. 57, 194 (1934-5). · 
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None of the counsel or the Court in the Murdock case as 
much as cited the McRae case.1110 The quoted language in the 
Murdock case was accordingly based on an inadequate presenta-
tion by counsel on both sides, and a misunderstanding of the 
English law by the court. 
Between the Murdock case and the· Ullman case there were 
several Supreme Court decisions which did not show the regard 
for the right of silence that one should wish,1111 but none is 
inconsistent with the proposition that a federal immunity act, 
to be valid, must give protection against the danger of state 
prosecution wherever that danger is substantial. Indeed, this 
proposition will reconcile the result in the Murdock case with 
the results and opinions in the earlier Supreme Court cases. 
The time has come for a reexamination of the opinion in 
the Murdock case, and two federal courts, the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit and the District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio, in recent cases have done just this. Both 
cases involved claims of privilege before a subcommittee of the 
Kefauver Committee. In both the real danger was not federal 
but state prosecution. In both the court sustained the claim. In 
both it reached for this result, in the one by going out of its 
way to find a danger of federal prosecution and in the other by 
stressing the fact that the investigation was into violations of 
state law. In both the court relied on United States v. Saline 
Bank1112 and Ballmann v. Fagin,1113 and refused to apply the 
Murdock case. In one of these two recent cases, Marcello v. 
United States,1114 the defendant was asked whether he knew one 
150 Although the government in its brief (at 15-16) quoted at length from the opinion 
in King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, supra note 141, it in no way indicated that the 
quoted language had been qualified and restricted in the later case of United States v. 
McRae, supra note 142. 
151 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944) (testimony given by a debtor in a 
discovery proceeding in a state court in New York, most of which was given under a 
limited immunity provision which simply forbade the use of such testimony in a subs·e-
quent criminal proceeding against the debtor, held admissible against him in a federal 
court on the trial of a mail fraud indictment); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 
(1953) (federal occupational tax on gamblers sustained as to persons in the states); 
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (federal wagering tax stamp and documentary 
evidence from federal internal revenue collector's office permitted in evidence in state 
court criminal proceeding); Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955) (federal occupa-
tional tax on gamblers upheld as to persons in the District of Columbia); Regan v. New 
York, 349 U.S. 58 (1955) (state criminal contempt conviction sustained because of broad 
state immunity statute). 
11121 Pet. (26 U.S.) 100 (1828). 
111a 200 U.S. 186 (1906). 
1114 (5th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 437. 
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Vitalli, who was supposed to be connected with a murder. The 
·trial judge considered· the murder a state offense and ruled 
against the defendant's claim of privilege. The court of appeals 
·reversed, pointing out that the defendant might be confronted 
with a charge of causing Vitalli to travel in interstate or foreign 
commerce with intent to avoid prosecution. In the course of its 
opinion the .court said: 
" ... With much inconsistency, we may indulge the hope 
that more state courts will follow the lead of the Supreme 
Court of Michigan in the view that, 
'It seems like a travesty on verity to say that one is not 
subjected to self-incrimination when compelled to give testi-
mony in a State judicial proceeding which testimony may 
forthwith be used against him in a Federal criminal prose-
cution.' . . .. "11:;5 
In the other recent case, United States v. DiCarlo,156 the 
court after discussing United States v. Saline Bank, with a quota-
tion of the opinion in extenso, and Ballmann v. Fagin, with a 
pertinent quotation, continued: · 
"Thus, in cases decided before United States v. Murdock, 
supra, two of the most illustrious jurists ever to sit upon the 
Supreme Court, speaking for the court, recognized the privi-
lege of the witness and of parties in a federal proceeding, to 
immunity against disclosures that would expose them to the 
danger of state prosecutions; and in the only Supreme Court 
decision relied upon by the government the court made 
special note of the absence of any matter of 'state concern.' "157 
Law review comment generally has been favorable to the 
Di Carlo decision.158 
Reference may also be made to the fact that a number of 
state court decisions have extended the protection of the right 
of silence to the danger of prosecutions in other jurisdictions, 
1115 Id. at 443. 
156 (N.D. Ohio 1952) 102 F. Supp. 597. 
157 Id. at 604. 
158 See, e.g., notes 22 UNIV. CIN. L. REv. 193 (1953); 26 TEMP. L. Q. 64 (1952); 66 
HARv. L. REv. 185 (1952); 31 TEX. L. REv. 433 (1953). Contra: comment, 4 STAN. L. R.Ev. 
594 (1952). The first writer stated: "The DiCarlo case is a step fonvard in protecting 
the individual citizen from any arbitrary encroachments by one of the government's 
many investigating committees, at least where the investigation is directly aimed at 
violation of state laws." 22 UNIV. CIN. L. REv. 193 at 204. The second writer said: 
"The DiCarlo case well illustrates the fallacy of the two sovereignties theory." 26 TEMP. 
L Q. 64 at 69. 
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wherever that danger has been substantial.159 The Michigan 
Supreme Court, in In re Watson/60 after a careful considera-
tion of the authorities rejected the opinion in the Murdock 
case, and stated: 
"We believe that this ancient privilege should be main-
tained against limitations that we conceive tend to make it 
ineffectual, futile, and subversive of the spirit and letter of 
the Bill of Rights. Under our Federal system of government,. 
with co-extensive jurisdiction of State and national govern-
ment, a person subject to the laws of a State is, at the same 
time, subject to the laws of the Federal government. A citizen 
of a State is a citizen of the United States .... After a review 
of the authorities and a consideration of the constitutional 
provisions and the principles involved, we are of the opinion 
that the privilege against self-incrimination exonerates from 
disclosure whenever there is a probability of prosecution in 
State or Federal jurisdictions .... 
"To overcome the privilege, the extent of the immunity 
would have to be of such a nature that it would protect, not 
only against State prosecution, but also against any reasonably 
probable Federal prosecution. The claim of the privilege in 
the face of a State immunity statute cannot be used as a sub-
terfuge or pretense to refuse to answer in proceedings to de-
tect or suppress crime. But neither can the grant be used to 
compel answers that will lead straight to Federal prosecution. 
Whenever the danger of prosecution for a Federal offense is 
substantial and imminent as a result of disclosures to be made 
under a grant of immunity by the State, such immunity is 
insufficient to overcome the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.''161 
The court's opm1on in a recent Michigan case, People v. Den 
Uyl,162 termed the restriction of the privilege accorded by a 
state to exclude federal prosecutions "a travesty on verity."163 
1119 See, e.g., State v. Dominguez, 228 La. 283, 82 S. (2d) 12 (1955); State v. Doran, 
215 La. 151, 39 S. (2d) 894 (1949); People v. Hoffa, 318 Mich. 656, 29 N.W. (2d) 292 
(1947); People v. DenUyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W. (2d) 284 (1947); In re Watson, 293 
Mich. 263 at 284-286, 291 N.W. 652 (1940); Frad v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 178 
Misc. 705, 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 250 (1941), affd. without opinion, 264 App. Div. 836, 35 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 756, motion for leave to appeal denied, 264 App: Div. 853, 36 N.Y.S. (2d) 178 (1942). 
Contra, State v. Morgan, 164 Ohio St. 529, 133 N.E. (2d) 104 (1956). 
160 293 Mich. 263, 291 N.W. 652 (1940). 
161 Id. at 284-286. 
162 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W. (2d) 284 (1947). 
163 Id. at 651. 
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This language was quoted with approval in Marcello v. United 
States.164 
In Matter of Doyle,165 a case arising out of an investigation 
by a joint committee of the legislature into bribery of public 
officials in the city_ of New York, the New York Court of Ap-
peals, in an opinion by Chief Judge Cardozo, "put aside as 
remote and unsubstantial the supposed peril of exposure to 
prosecution for the making of false tax returns to State or Federal 
officers."166 Many, if not most, of the state cases which have 
denied a claim of privilege where it was based on the danger 
of a prosecution by another jurisdiction can be explained on 
the ground that the danger of such prosecution was too remote 
to be given serious consideration.167 Wherever danger of prosecu-
tion by another jurisdiction, at least within our own federal 
system is substantial, the danger should furnish a sufficient 
basis for a claim of privilege. That the danger of state prosecu-
tion in the area covered by the new federal act is substantial 
we have already abundantly s~en. 
[To be concluded.] 
164 (5th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 437 at 443. 
165 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489 (1931). 
166 Id. at 267. · 
167 See, e.g., Lorenzo v. Blackbum, (Fla. 1954) 74 S. (2d) 289; State v. Kelly, (Fla. 
1954) 71 S. (2d) 887; People v. Butler Street Foundry, 201 Ill. 236, 66. N.E. 349 (1903); 
Koa1;ck v. Cooney, 244 Iowa 153, 55 N.W. (2d) 269 (1952); Republic of Greece v. 
Koukouras, 264 Mass. 318, 162 N.E. 345 (1928) (foreign state); In re Cohen, 295 Mich. 
748, 295 N.W. 481 (1940); In re Ward, 295 Mich. 742, 295 N.W. 483 (1940); In re 
Schnitzer, 295 Mich. 736, 295 N.W. 478 (1940); In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 93 A. (2d) 176 
(1952); State v. March, 46 N.C. •526 (1854); In re Greenleaf, 176 Misc. 566, 28 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 28 (1941), affd. 266 App. Div. 658, 41 N.Y.S. (2d) 209, affd. 291 N.Y. 690, 52 N.E. 
(2d) 588 (1943); In re Cappeau, 198 App. Div. 357, 190 N.Y.S. 452 (1921); In re Werner, 
167. App. Div. 384, 152 N.Y .S. 862 (1915); Matter of Herlands (Carchietta), 204 Misc. 373, 
124 N.Y.S. (2d) 402 (1953); Ex parte Copeland, 91 Tex. Cr. 549, 240 S.W. 314 (1922); 
State v. Wood, 99 Vt. 490, 134 A. 697 (1926). In People y. Butler Street Foundry, supra, 
the court said (at 252): "But if it be conceded that there is a bare possibility tha.t ~e 
affidavit might contain disclosures which would furnish evidence of a violation of the 
Anti-trust statute of some other State of the Union or of the United States, we think, 
within the meaning of the authorities, that such disclosure is not a real and probable 
danger, and does not fall within the danger which the constitutional privilege was in• 
·tended to obviate." In Ex parte Copeland, supra, the court ruled (at 559): "The further 
reason urged that relator should not answer the questions because the State court and 
district attorney had no right to guarantee immunity from Federal prosecution has such 
a shadowy and µncertain basis that we scarcely deem. it necessary to discuss it." In Gould 
v. Gould, 201 App. Div. 674, 194 N.Y.S. 742 (1922), prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction 
had already been concluded. · 
